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Helm: Arc of Moral Justice

LOUIS BRANDEIS’S ARC OF MORAL JUSTICE
Katherine A. Helm*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Louis Dembitz Brandeis, as a Justice of the Supreme Court, is
an infamous figure in American jurisprudence. “As in the case of
many justices, Brandeis was first a practicing attorney; a professional
that had to face the daily nuances of conflict that inhere in one’s legal
practice.”1 Brandeis was a devoted American, who took his civic
duties seriously and who chose to use his status in, and his
knowledge of, the law in part to promote social change. As such, he
labored too with the overlay of occasionally having publicly
promoted policy and governance not always symmetrical with his
clients’ causes and the litigative stances he previously took on their
behalf. The trajectory of his life as a lawyer made him an uncommon
force for change, but still a lawyer that corporate America wanted.
As such Brandeis was a provocative figure indeed. He was a man
true to himself and, critically here, always an independent contractor
– never bowing as a servant.2
Accordingly, when it came to his confirmation by the United
States Senate, after President Woodrow Wilson nominated Louis
Brandeis to the U.S. Supreme Court, Brandeis faced a considerable
*Katherine

A. Helm, J.D., Ph.D., is a senior litigation associate at Simpson Thacher &
Bartlett LLP. Her practice focuses on representing clients in complex patent litigation and
related intellectual property, antitrust and international arbitration matters. Dr. Helm has
published over 50 articles, book chapters and commentary on a variety of legal issues,
including as a legal columnist for Law.com. A longer version of this article, focusing on
legal ethics, appeared in the Journal of the Legal Profession in Fall 2010.
1 Katherine A. Helm, What Justice Brandeis Taught Us About Conflicts of Interests, 35 J.
LEGAL PROF. 1 (2010).
2 Inspiration for this article, and most of the historical accounting on Brandeis’s ethics,
came from the following four sources: MELVIN I. UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: A LIFE
(Schocken eds., 1st ed. 2009); A.L. TODD, JUSTICE ON TRIAL: THE CASE OF LOUIS D.
BRANDEIS (McGraw Hill eds. 1964); John P. Frank, The Legal Ethics of Louis D. Brandeis,
17 STAN. L. REV. 683 (1965); and Clyde Spillenger, Elusive Advocate: Reconsidering
Brandeis as People’s Lawyer, 105 YALE L.J. 1445 (1996).
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uproar from his opponents in the legislature.3 That opposition did not
aim its attention at the socio-legal agenda that Brandeis might choose
to advocate once on the Court - such as in the case, for example, of
more recent nominees like Robert Bork - but aimed instead at the
problematic ethical quandaries that might have confronted Brandeis
during the course of his legal career, both in the clients and causes on
whose behalf he sought to advocate. 4
Some might argue that, at bottom, Brandeis was scrutinized
so severely by the Senate Judiciary Committee not because the issues
raised against him were meritorious, but rather because these issues
were mere smokescreens fomented by the anti-Semitism of the day.5
But whether or not a religious or social bias caused the strict scrutiny
into Brandeis’s past which he faced, to use the language of today, the
raw fact is that Brandeis’s conduct as an attorney, rightly or wrongly,
did indeed occasionally raise nettlesome ethical questions deserving
of analysis.6
Setting aside whether the scrutiny of Brandeis was indeed
politically motivated, to soften the perceived motives of his attackers
and focus on the “lessons learned,” the issue addressed in this article
is whether his legal conduct would be challengeable through the
prism of today’s ethical mores, and with the benefit of hindsight and
perspective over time, now on a more objective level.
How do we, including those of us who do not aspire to a
judicial appointment, learn from and modify our conduct as attorneys
when faced with the conflicts that faced Brandeis? Stated otherwise,
on the major issues that faced him in the Senate concerning client
conflicts of interest, did Brandeis behave ethically? There were

3

See UROFSKY, supra note 2, at 437-38.
In the candid words of Sen. Ted Kaufman (D-Del.), member of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, during a June 26, 2009 interview, “[t]he big difference was, after [Robert] Bork,
the process became like the Super Bowl.” Interview, The National Law Journal, Q&A With
Sen. Ted Kaufman (June 29, 2009), http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2009/06/qa-with-sented-kaufman.html. Further, Sen. Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) stated that “[J]udicial appointments
have become increasingly contentious.” Senate Judiciary Hearing Transcript, The United
States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, The Nomination of Judge Sonia Sotomayor to be
an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States Judiciary (July 13, 2009),
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/the-nomination-of-sonia-sotomayor-to-be-anassociate-justiceof-the-supreme-court-of-the-united-states.
Brandeis’s confirmation hearings may represent the one exception to this otherwise
generally true statement.
5 HELM, supra note 1, at 3-4.
6 HELM, supra note 1, at 4.
4
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several attacks made about Brandeis’s legal ethics in practice during
his confirmation hearings. This article focuses on the one that
consumed the most time and attention on the Senate floor, the issue
of prior clients and successive or situational conflicts of interest.
II.

ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS TO FORMER CLIENTS

As any attorney with his or her own book of business knows,
perhaps the most vexing part of law firm practice is the inevitable
problem of client conflicts of interest.7 Whether a lawyer can take on
a new client depends on what work that lawyer and other lawyers at
his or her firm have done in the past.8 The prevailing wisdom is that
a conflict of interest arises when a lawyer’s professional judgment is
compromised, or appears to be compromised, due to contrary
influences or diverging interests between clients.9 In the case law,
conflicts often arise when there are competing financial interests
between the counsel and the client that could affect the counsel’s
duty of loyalty to his or her client.10
Legal ethics rules governing conflicts of interest apply to
individual clients and corporate clients alike and are very general,
e.g., the American Bar Association (“ABA”) Model Rules 1.7
(concurrent conflicts) and 1.9 (successive conflicts).11 These rules
aim to provide workable guidelines to help lawyers establish a system
for siphoning out clear conflicts and for recognizing when conflicts
may be permitted after appropriate disclosure and approval.12
Practitioners are often frustrated by the open-ended nature of these
rules, however, which seem to lend themselves to academic study by
law professors on conflicts and other matters of professional
responsibility rather than to their actual practical application to assist

7

HELM, supra note 1, at 10.
HELM, supra note 1, at 10-11.
9 HELM, supra note 1, at 11.
10 See, e.g., United States v. Schwarz, 283 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2002) (disqualifying a lawyer
due to an interest in another client’s retainer, which created an actual conflict of interest and
violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel). A
conflict could also arise when the lawyer has some form of ownership interest in the client
being represented, e.g., recall when Brandeis was both counsel for and a director of the
United Shoe Machinery Company, as discussed infra.
11 HELM, supra note 1, at 11.
12 HELM, supra note 1, at 11.
8
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and benefit practicing lawyers and their clients.13 This article
examines the tension between an important conflict rule’s intent and
its practical implications, as exemplified in a controversy involving
Justice Louis Brandeis.
Rule 1.9 of the ABA Model Rules deals with a lawyer’s
professional obligations to former clients.14 It sets forth the legal
standard under which any practicing attorney should operate.15 The
Rule states that a lawyer “who has formerly represented a client in a
matter shall not thereafter represent another person in the same or a
substantially related matter in which that person’s interests are
materially adverse to the interests of the former client” unless the
former client consents.16 The italicized language highlights the three
questions for disqualification: Is there a former client; is the new
matter substantially related; and are the former client’s interests
materially adverse to the prospective client’s interests.17 All three of
these questions must be answered in the negative before the lawyer
can bring the new client in the door.18
The “substantial relationship test” in Model Rule 1.9 also
appears in Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.9, the New York
Code provision governing former client conflicts.
This test
19
effectively serves as a proxy for court inspection. After one client
relationship terminates, a lawyer has certain continuing fiduciary
duties, with respect to confidentiality, loyalty, disclosure and acting
in a client’s best interest, which is not rescindable on behalf of a new
13 HELM, supra note 1, at 11. In the words of Chief Justice Roberts: “[T]he law professors
aren’t the ones who deal with this question on a day-to-day basis and have to worry about
going to jail. . . .” See Transcript of Oral Argument at 39:7-10, Mohawk Indus. Inc. v.
Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100 (2009) (No. 08-678).
14 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.9 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2009).
15 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Scope (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).
16 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.9 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (emphasis added)
(explaining that consent must be informed and confirmed in writing).
17 The origin of the “substantial relationship” test is generally credited to Judge
Weinfeld’s opinion in T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 265,
268 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (explaining the policy reasons why a substantial relationship test exists
for former clients but not current clients).
18 Id. at 269.
19
The test was formulated so that the court need not make the inappropriate inquiry into
whether actual confidences were disclosed. Id. at 269 (“To compel the client to show, in
addition to establishing that the subject of the present adverse representation is related to the
former, the actual confidential matters previously entrusted to the attorney and their possible
value to the present client would tear aside the protective cloak drawn about the lawyerclient relationship.”). Id.
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client.20 At the same time, a lawyer has the duty to offer a
prospective new client legal representation free of conflicts from the
lawyer’s prior representation of clients having interests adverse to the
prospective client.21 The substantial relationship test boils down to a
question of whether the lawyer could have obtained confidential
information in the first representation that would have been relevant
in the second representation.22 It is of no moment whether the lawyer
would or could use the information.23 If the answer is yes, the lawyer
cannot sign on the second, successive client, unless the former
affected client provides informed written consent.24
The ABA now permits the presumption that confidences were
revealed to be rebutted in some circumstances through the use of
certain institutional mechanisms at law firms—like screens and
ethical walls.25 This presumption is limited though, and generally
only applies when a lawyer switches firms and an adversary of a
client of that lawyer or his former firm then retains the new firm.26
Nowadays, most large firms require their clients to sign
waivers upon retention, which seek to avoid future conflicts by
having the client waive certain of their rights in advance.27 Most
N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.9 cmt. 1 (2016).
Id.
22 N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.9 cmt. 3 (2016).
23 N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.9 cmt. 8 (2016).
24
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.9(b)(2) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016)
A former client is not required to reveal the confidential information
learned by the lawyer in order to establish a substantial risk that the
lawyer has confidential information to use in the subsequent matter. A
conclusion about the possession of such information may be based on
the nature of the services the lawyer provided the former client and
information that would in ordinary practice be learned by a lawyer
providing such services.
25 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.10 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).
26 The new firm can avoid disqualification by imputation, under MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT r. 1.10, by showing that protective steps were taken to prevent confidences from
being received by lawyers in the new firm handling the new matter. N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT r. 1.10 (2016). However, not all states permit the uses of screens, while other
states recognize screening mechanisms only to avoid disqualification but not as an ethical
matter. See, e.g., Hempstead Video, Inc. v. Inc. Vill. of Valley Stream, 409 F.3d 127, 132
(2d Cir. 2005) (explaining that not every violation of a disciplinary rule requires
disqualification because disqualification is only warranted where “an attorney’s conduct
tends to taint the underlying trial,” while ethical violations can be left to federal and state
disciplinary mechanisms) (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1246 (2d Cir.
1979)).
27 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.10(c), cmt. 6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016); see,
e,g., Merri A. Baldwin, Risky Business: Identifying, Preventing, and Managing Conflicts of
20
21
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clients are familiar with the process whereby once they express
interest in retaining a law firm, they receive an engagement letter
detailing some of the basic terms upon which the firm would be
providing legal services. While some clients or lawyers might prefer
less formal methods of confirming the terms of the lawyer-client
relationship, it is considered good ethical practice and is infinitely
useful to have a letter that lays out the terms of engagement both to
the lawyer and to the client prior to beginning work on the matter.28
Moreover, the laws of many states now require engagement letters.29
Typical language in a client engagement letter grants written
permission for the law firm to be adverse to that client in all but the
same or substantially the same area.30 Some waiver language may
grant permission for the firm to represent future clients adverse to
them in related areas, under certain conditions but excluding direct
litigation against the current or former client.31 Other waiver
language may grant permission for the firm to represent future clients
in related areas only after the present client matter is completed.32
The enforceability of some of the more extensive contractual
provisions is often temporally limited and may be either expressly or
inherently limited in the context of binding large corporate families.33
Waivers are not wholesale panaceas, clearly, as the contractual
language can vary from client to client and some clients may refuse
to waive any rights in advance.34 Whether the law firm will retain the

Interest,
AM.
BAR.
ASSOC.
(May
20,
2014),
http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/womanadvocate/articles/spring2014-0514risky-business-identifying-preventing-managing-conflicts-of-interest.html.
28 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.5, cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016); see, e,g
Marian C. Rice, Engagement Letters: Beginning a Beautiful Relationship, AM. BAR. ASSOC.
(June 2013), http://www.americanbar.org/publications/law_practice_magazine/2013/mayjune/ethics.html.
29 See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1215.1 (2002) (showing that in New
York, engagement letters are required as an ethical matter).
30 Helm, supra note 1, at 14.
31 Helm, supra note 1, at 14.
32 Helm, supra note 1, at 14.
33 For example, the court in Elonex I.P. Holdings, Ltd. v. Apple Computer, Inc., 142 F.
Supp. 2d 579, 582-84 (D. Del. 2001) found that Apple was sufficiently informed about the
conflict in granting a full waiver and not merely a transactional waiver, based on the extent
and nature of high-level discussions the firm had with Apple’s in-house counsel. Id. See
Helm, supra note 1, at 14.
34 See, e.g., Zusha Elinson, Wet Blankets: GCs Don’t Waiver, THE RECORDER (June 9,
2008),
http://www.therecorder.com/id=1202422009415/Wet-Blankets-GCs-DontWaiver?slreturn=20170020090012 (discussing the trend of Silicon Valley technology
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client who has not agreed to the waiver provision depends on a host
of factors that includes the amount of business the client brings to the
firm and the history of the client’s relationship with the firm.35
Moreover, tacit concerns exist about some of the more adhesive
waivers and whether potential attempts to contract around ethical
obligations are themselves unethical.36
It is hardly surprising that even the best of lawyers can find
themselves muddling these ethical obligations when trying to be a
good rainmaker and get new clients in the door. None of us is
immune from the temptation to just fix the problem later, i.e., to ask
for forgiveness instead of seeking permission beforehand. With
former client conflicts in particular, the temptation to gloss over ties
to past relationships to present oneself as being available for future
opportunities can be hard to resist.
III.

BRANDEIS’S 1916 CONFIRMATION HEARINGS

The issue of former client conflicts arose in Louis D.
Brandeis’s Senate hearings on his nomination to the U.S. Supreme
Court in 1916.37 Prior to his appointment by President Woodrow
Wilson, Brandeis had been the head of a New England law
partnership with his law school classmate Samuel Warren for almost
forty years.38 Brandeis successfully positioned himself as an expert
legal strategist on commercial matters during the Second Industrial
Revolution and clients relied on him for sage business advice along
with legal counsel during the “great merger wave” that created megacorporations in many industries at the time including steel and
tobacco.39 By all accounts, Brandeis’s legacy as a visionary legal
mind rests not only on his celebrated judicial works but also his
companies to balk at engagement letters by outside counsel requesting up-front, blanket
unconditional waivers of future conflicts of interest). See also Helm, supra note 1, at 14.
35 Helm, supra note 1, at 14.
36 Helm, supra note 1, at 14.
37 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Lawyer for the Situation, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 377, 377 (2004);
Helm, supra note 1, at 5.
38 Nutter, Nutter Recognizes the 100th Anniversary of Founding Partner Louis Brandeis’s
Nomination
to
the
U.S.
Supreme
Court,
NUTTER
(Jan.
28,
2016),
http://www.nutter.com/Nutter-Recognizes-the-100th-Anniversary-of-Founding-PartnerLouis-Brandeiss-Nomination-to-the-US-Supreme-Court-01-28-2016/; Helm, supra note 1, at
5.
39 See JACK BEATTY, AGE OF BETRAYAL: THE TRIUMPH OF MONEY IN AMERICA 1865-1900
22-24 (Vintage eds. 2008).
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common biographical depiction as having been “the people’s
attorney” in both his corporate law and litigation practice.40 Perhaps
because of the inescapable interweaving of public and private issues
that occurred as Brandeis advanced both social policy and client
positions in a public forum throughout his career, the lawyer faced
fierce accusations in his confirmation hearings that he had violated
legal ethics in his law practice.41 Of all the ethical fitness issues the
Judiciary Committee raised, the two largest debates focused on client
conflicts of interest, and the one that consumed the most floor time
was the matter of United Shoe Machinery Company -- Brandeis’s
former client.42
The United Shoe Machinery Company was formed shortly
before the turn of the century by a consolidation of several smaller
companies.43 One of the groups that became a large shareholder in
United was Brandeis’s client.44 Brandeis subsequently became a
director of United and also served United as counsel.45 Prior to the
adoption of the Sherman Antitrust Act, which Congress passed in
1890 “to protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and
monopolies,”46 United and its predecessors had been leasing their
patented shoe machinery for use by shoe manufacturers.47 The lease
agreements contained “tying” clauses, which required a lessee to use
the patented machinery in conjunction only with other patented
machinery.48 This gave the lessor a considerable monopolistic
advantage.49

40 John Braeman, The People’s Lawyer Revisited: Louis D. Brandeis Versus The United
Shoe Machinery Company, 50 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 284, 284-86 (2008-10); Helm, supra note
1, at 2.
41 Hazard, supra note 37, at 377.
42 See Urofsky, supra note 2, at 310, 451 (noting that Brandeis’s allies “understood from
the beginning” that the United matter would be the most damaging of all the ethical charges
leveled against Brandeis in his confirmation hearings); TODD, supra note 2, at 151 (noting
that Brandeis’s camp recognized the United matter “as the stickiest part of the combined
campaign to defeat the nomination”).
43 John Shepard Wiley, Jr., et al., The Leasing Monopolist, 37 UCLA L. REV. 693, 697
(1990).
44 UROFSKY, supra note 2, at 310.
45 Braeman, supra note 40, at 287.
46 Sherman Anti-Trust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 12(a) (2012)).
47 Frank, supra note 2, at 703.
48 Braeman, supra note 40, at 289.
49 Frank, supra note 2, at 703.
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At first blush, United’s practice of precluding its own
customers (shoe manufacturers) from using machinery manufactured
by competitors, or put another way, United’s practice of forcing shoe
manufacturers to use only United products if they used any, seems
plainly anticompetitive. However, it is important to consider the
prevailing law at the time. In 1895, the Supreme Court refused to
apply the Sherman Act to the American Sugar Refining Company,
which controlled a large majority of the manufactories of refined
sugar in the United States and had a “practical monopoly of the
business,” on the ground that Congress had the ability to regulate
commerce but not manufacturing.50 The conservative Court insisted
that Congress’s power to regulate commerce did not extend to the
regulation of manufacturing in numerous cases in the late 1800s and
early 1900s.51 It would be years before the Court shifted and, in the
dawning of the New Deal Era, recognized that the effects of many
kinds of intrastate activity upon interstate commerce were such as to
make them a proper subject of federal regulation.52
Against that backdrop, United operated its lease system
relatively safely under a narrow reading of the antitrust laws at the
time Brandeis served as its counsel.53 However, the issue was not
without debate in the legislatures. In 1906, a bill was introduced in
the Massachusetts Legislature to do what the federal Sherman
Antitrust Act was not accomplishing and restrict tying clauses. 54 At
United’s request, Brandeis reluctantly agreed to appear before the
legislature and seek the defeat of the bill that would have outlawed
the tying clauses in United’s contracts with shoe manufacturers.55
Of notable interest was the fact that Brandeis was also counsel
to a number of shoe manufacturers at the time.56 The conflict had
been waived, however, as the shoe manufacturers had consented to
the dual representation as part of their agreement with United that
they would not support the legislation in exchange for receiving a
favorable rate on United’s products should the contracts remain

50 Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 238 (1899); United States v.
E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1895).
51 Addyston, 175 U.S. at 227; E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. at 12-14.
52 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 121-22 (1942).
53 Frank, supra note 2, at 704.
54 Braeman, supra note 40, at 294.
55 Frank, supra note 2, at 704.
56 Frank, supra note 2, at 705.
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enforceable.57 Setting aside the reasonableness of that waiver,
Brandeis’s decision to appear before the state legislature in defense of
practices that placed significant restraints on both the manufacturers
and competing shoe machineries’ right to do business was both
legally and ethically debatable.58
This was not the issue that got Brandeis into trouble at his
confirmation hearings, though. After Brandeis appeared for United,
and helped stop the state legislation, he continued to monitor the law
and became doubtful about the legality of United’s tying
arrangements.59 He called his opinion to the attention of United’s
counsel and later that same year tendered his resignation, first as a
director and then as counsel for United.60 United and its successor
corporation continued to employ various tying arrangements in its
business.61 These eventually formed part of the landmark antitrust
decision, United States v. United Shoe Machinery Co.62
Meanwhile, shortly after Brandeis had ceased working for
United, in 1907 the Massachusetts Legislature succeeded in passing a
new bill against such leases and tying clauses.63 Brandeis had no role
in that legislation and for some years thereafter he refused, on ethical
grounds, requests by his remaining shoe manufacturer clients to assist
them in opposing United’s increasingly sophisticated leasing
practices.64 In 1910, however, after the Supreme Court had begun to
embrace a broader reading of the Sherman Antitrust Act, Brandeis
gave an opinion to another shoe machinery manufacturer that tying
clauses were illegal.65
The following year, Brandeis undertook the representation of
the Shoe Manufacturers’ Alliance, a consortium of shoe

57

Frank, supra note 2, at 704.
Frank, supra note 2, at 704.
59 Frank, supra note 2, at 704.
60 ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN’S LIFE 219-20 (The Viking Press
eds., 1946).
61 Id. at 220.
62 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff’d, 347 U.S. 521 (1954) (per curiam).
63 MASON, supra note 60, at 220.
64 MASON, supra note 60, at 221.
65 Brandeis’s opinion was based on the 1909 Supreme Court holding that a combination of
wallpaper companies had violated the Sherman Act by forcing exclusive patronage to the
conglomerate and by raising wholesaler and consumer prices, which was detrimental to the
public interest. See Cont’l Wall Paper Co. v. Louis Voight & Sons Co., 212 U.S. 227
(1909).
58
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manufacturers opposed to the giant United’s market strategies.66 The
federal government then commenced an antitrust prosecution of
United, in which Brandeis had no direct role.67 However, during that
1911-1913 time frame, Brandeis testified before several
congressional committees and federal agencies in support of
legislation that became the Clayton Act,68 at the request of his client
Shoe Manufacturers’ Alliance.69 In his appearances, Brandeis cited
United’s continued oppressive behavior as evidence of the need for
changes in the antitrust laws.70 This sequence of events is what
inspired the harshest attacks on Brandeis’s character by Republican
senators during his nomination debacle.
The Senate committee viewed the issue as one bedeviled by
conflicts.71 The gravamen of the charge was that Brandeis acted
against his former client United, having previously acted for that
client in a related matter.72 Brandeis defended his position on an
ideological level, addressing the inherent difficulties of the
“independent lawyer” struggling to break free of a former client’s
coercion.73
The objectors at Brandeis’s nomination hearings
constructed some tendentious arguments to sustain their objections to
his appointment.74
The vast shift in the law between the time when Brandeis
represented United in 1906 and when he opposed United in 19111913 arguably precluded any direct conflict with a former client.75
However, was the matter still substantially related, at least in spirit,
so as to mar Brandeis’s credibility in acting out against United? If
Brandeis were to be reprimanded for his behavior, what message
were the senators sending him, as a lawyer? Must all lawyers refuse
to embroil themselves in any representation that could even
potentially conflict with an earlier representation, in the broadest
66

MASON, supra note 60, at 223.
MASON, supra note 60, at 223.
68 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1914).
69 MASON, supra note 60, at 224.
70 A colorful historical anecdote illustrates the glacial rate of acceptance of such change
by corporate America. In 1912, Andrew Carnegie made the following breezy statement to a
congressional committee that was investigating U.S. Steel: “Nobody ever mentioned the
Sherman Act to me, that I can remember.” See BEATTY, supra note 39, at 220.
71 MASON, supra note 60, at 224-25.
72 MASON, supra note 60, at 224.
73 MASON, supra note 60, at 229.
74 See TODD, supra note 2, at 110-12.
75 See Frank, supra note 2 at 704.
67
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terms possible and irrespective of an about-face change in the law?
That hardly seems reasonable.
Indeed, several witnesses supporting Brandeis’s nomination
pointed this out, arguing that lawyers’ minds must be available to
craft all of the best arguments for their clients irrespective of
positions they may have taken for former clients.76 Many witnesses
argued that Brandeis’s adaptability of mind made him a superior
attorney and would make him an even better justice when he would
be called on to apply the law to the ever-changing realities of modern
industrial democracy which made him a superior attorney and would
make him an even better justice.77
Modern ethics rules can inform the aforementioned question,
although they may fall short of providing the “right” answer. A
lawyer must not act against a former client where the lawyer has
relevant confidential information about that client from an earlier
retainer, which may be used against the client.78 Regardless of
whether that information is used or not, the appearance of
impropriety is sufficient to bar the future representation, unless the
former client consents.79 Even if the lawyer did not in fact obtain any
relevant or confidential information, the fiduciary duty of loyalty the
lawyer owes to the former client extends the lawyer’s prohibition on
acting against the former client, in the same or a substantially related
matter representing interests adverse to the former client, again,
absent consent or a waiver of an objection in writing.80
That said, a lawyer cannot realistically be forever bound by
the interests of a former client for all public and private matters of
interest to the lawyer. Brandeis argued, somewhat cagily, that he
supported the Clayton Act on a personal level and that he represented
76

See MASON, supra note 60, at 475, 482.
See generally TODD, supra note 2. For a specific example, one witness testified: “If
there is one characteristic of Mr. Brandeis’[s] thinking, it is his capacity to see both sides; it
is his capacity not only for judicial statement, but for judicial thought.” TODD, supra note 2,
at 153 (quoting testimony from Henry Moskowitz, Clerk of the Board of Arbitration
covering the New York garment industry, which had benefited from Brandeis’s arbitration
system).
78 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.9 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).
79 Id. But see Kathleen Maher, Keeping Up Appearances, 16 PROF. LAW. 1, 1, 12 (2005)
(pointing out that the American Bar Association Ethics 2000 Commission in 2002 removed
reference to the “appearance of impropriety” standard because it was “no longer helpful to
the analysis of questions arising under this Rule”).
80 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.9 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016); see MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.9 cmts. 1, 3-5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).
77
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himself in acting to advance the public interests.81 In support of this
contention was the fact that he took no fee from (actually, he donated
his fee back to) the Shoe Manufacturers’ Alliance.82 He garnered
some support from Senators in propounding the notion that a
lawyer’s opinion on matters of public interest should not be
circumscribed by client preferences.
Indeed, it is often acknowledged that it is a mistake to judge a
lawyer by the clients he or she represents. A lawyer often find
himself accepting legal work on behalf of a client in whose activities
the lawyer does not personally believe. Many criminal defense
attorneys would be out of work if they did not have the freedom to
separate their personal convictions from their professional
representations. In concurrence with one author who eloquently
defended Brandeis, it would indeed be a tough law practice if the
lawyer were required to underwrite the character of each of his
clients.83
A temporary incursion on a lawyer’s time and life by a
pressing client matter is an unenviable but wholly expected and
acceptable part of legal practice. A permanent incursion, however, is
not. Legal ethics do not require a practicing attorney to become an
automaton merely because, at one time, she subordinated her own
interests or defined her public persona principally by her client’s
goals. ABA Model Rule 1.9 recognizes that the “substantial
relationship” test does not persist ad infinitum.84 Confidential
information that was or could have been gained in the course of a
former client relationship can be rendered innocuous and obsolete by
the passage of time or if the information has been disclosed to the
public.85
The transition of private to public knowledge is, in fact, a
fundamental part of legal ethics that allows lawyers to maintain
confidences and abide by the other fiduciary duties to their past and
current clients, whilst also maintaining a functioning life in public
society.86 A lawyer has the right to engage in public debate, to take
81

See Frank, supra note 2, at 704-05.
See Frank, supra note 2, at 704.
83 Frank, supra note 2, at 686.
84 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.9 cmt. 3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).
85 Id.
86 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.9 cmt. 3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016); see also
Pamela A. Bresnahan & Timothy H. Goodman, Breach of Fiduciary Duty and Expert
Testimony Regarding Attorney Ethics Rules, PROF. LAW., SYMP. 53, 54 (2003).
82
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seriously his civic duties, and to get involved in political and social
justice causes, as do all citizens.87 However, lawyers just have to
remember to parse out “public” questions from “private” questions
insofar as they concern client confidences. Particularly in the case of
former client conflicts, confidences can be construed ambiguously.
How much information, knowledge and wisdom a lawyer gains from
a prior representation that can ethically be construed as a client
confidence is a vexatious question.
IV.

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

What is the provenance of a lawyer’s sapience? The issue is
existential in nature. Brandeis recognized this, and refused to unduly
fetter his public opinions on behalf of his private clients.88 Legal
ethics should find a way to embrace, rather than shun, this ethos.
Brandeis’s response to the Senators’ upbraiding is emblematic
of his character, for two main reasons.89 First, Brandeis brought a
moral dimension to his legal practice: he regularly engaged in
informal pro bono practice, refusing compensation for legal work that
he believed was in the public interest, he reputedly outright refused to
take on paying cases in whose justness he did not believe, and he
sternly counseled clients against taking positions in their legal
disputes that adopted unfavorable social policy.90 Second, Brandeis
brought an autonomous lawyering ethic to his practice that was
antithetical to the New England clubbiness attitude of legal practice.91
Brandeis rejected any close alliances with any group, political
party, cause, or client.92 His independent approach to legal practice
epitomizes his aversion to acting as a mere representative for an
anterior interest and to retain self-direction in his legal counseling.93
87

See John T. Baker, Citizen Lawyers—the Past, Present, and Future of the Legal
Profession, COLO. LAW. 99, 99 (2009) (defining “citizen lawyer” and stating that “civic
responsibility and civic involvement traditionally were the hallmarks of practicing law”).
88 See Spillenger, supra note 2, at 1470-71, 1474, 1476, 1517-18.
89 See MASON, supra note 60, at 478-79, 483.
90 See Spillenger, supra note 2, at 1477.
91 See, e.g., TODD, supra note 2, at 118 (quoting testimony by Boston lawyer Sherman
Whipple: “. . . I think if Mr. Brandeis had been a different sort of man, not so aloof, not so
isolated, with more of the camaraderie of the bar, gave his confidence to more men, and took
their confidence . . . and talked it over with them, you would not have heard the things you
have heard in regard to him.”).
92 See Spillenger, supra note 2, at 1451-56.
93 See Spillenger, supra note 2, at 1451.
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Indeed, many of Brandeis’s legal representations involved advocacy
in the legislature on a variety of social policy issues.94 As a legal
advocate, Brandeis mobilized a stridently nonpartisan voice for the
“public interest” that he strongly believed was needed to compete
with hard-charging interest groups and political power at the dawning
of an age of increased legislation and regulation.95 Brandeis prided
himself on being a detached, autonomous counselor, free of client
dictation, and even depicted himself in his Senate hearings as having
been “counsel for the situation,” a blunder which served him none too
well in extricating himself from the client conflict at hand.96
Nonetheless, Brandeis’s commitment to seek moral justice
outside the conventional confines of the strict adversarial system of
law now proscribed by a code of legal ethics is hardly reprobate.
Brandeis was an advocate of several public causes and was insightful
enough to recognize the benefits of legislative democracy over
litigative democracy.97 That is, Brandeis may have had the power as
an active litigant to make law, or rather, to get law made for his
clients and for himself. But he respectfully chose to support the
legislative process, imperfect as it may be, to express his political
views and to incorporate deliberation and compromise into the lawmaking process.98 We can hardly fault him for embracing the
democratic political system in this manner. Brandeis did not try to
legislate through lawsuits. It is almost ironic that his policy-making
endeavors ended up almost sidelining his chances for a career in the
judicial branch of government.
Certainly, we cannot judge Louis Brandeis the attorney for
failing to adhere to contemporaneous standards of behavior in the
then absence of a professional code of conduct, nor can we deem
immoral his methods without apt respect for the then zeitgeist – the
spirit of the times – and the manner in which other lawyers
comported themselves at that time. Giving fair value to the
objections made by the Senate committee members in 1916,
however, is Brandeis’s alleged shirking of certain of his ethical duties
to hereinafter be disparaged and dismissed as dated behavior that
94

See Spillenger, supra note 2, at 1487.
See Spillenger, supra note 2, at 1487 (citing DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN
ETHICAL STUDY, 380 (Princeton Univ. Press eds. 1988)).
96 See Spillenger, supra note 2, at 1449-51.
97 See LUBAN, supra note 95, at 380.
98 See Spillenger, supra note 2, at 1488-89.
95
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would simply not be a best practice for a lawyer in being accountable
to his former and successive clients? The applicable legal ethics rule,
indeed even now, is not a paragon of clarity on the issue. To what
extent must a lawyer subordinate his or her own views on policy to
persuasive advocacy on behalf of not even a current but a former
client’s interest? Must every lawyer be so scrupulously cautious at
the outset when engaging a new client to have prospectively
considered and rejected the possibility that such representation might
lead the lawyer to make arguments that could compromise his or her
credibility on all other public issues of personal interest?
If so, what does that say about how we want lawyers to
behave today--- to stop thinking independently once we retain our
first client, to give up all of our outside interests, and to slavishly
serve them forevermore? Indeed, the all-encompassing culture of
BigLaw suggests as much.99 But on an ideological level, do the ABA
Model Rules serve to promote and foster milquetoast lawyers acting
as mouthpieces for unchallenged client preferences? Even when
those clients are former clients? If so, we need to seriously think
about reevaluating the desirable balance of interests in the lawyerclient relationship. The legal ethics rules simply do not provide
sufficient distinction between a lawyer’s public and private life to
allow a practicing attorney to maintain both public autonomy and
lawyerly zeal in the context of the lawyer-client relationship.
Particularly in this day and age of strong and powerful corporate
clients, where zealous representation is the industry standard, young
attorneys entering private practice nowadays should think carefully
about advertising themselves as single-minded gladiators, pursuing a
single client’s interest without repose. Practicing attorneys should
maintain the values of freedom in choice and action, for their purpose
is not only to maintain peace and order but also to bring the public
administration of justice into touch with changing moral and political
conditions so as to promote progress in society. It would have been
what Brandeis wanted.100

99 See generally Anonymous, What’s It Like to Work at An Ultra Elite Law Firm, FORBES
(Nov. 2, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/quora/2012/11/02/whats-it-like-to-work-at-anultra-elite-law-firm/#61db7586ee1f.
100 See Melvin I. Urofsky, The Brandeis-Frankfurter Conversations, 1985 Sup. Ct. Rev.
299, 313-14 (1985).
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